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STATE OF CONFUSION: THE HIPAA PRIVACY
RULE AND STATE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE LAWS IN FEDERAL QUESTION CASES

I. INTRODUCTION

People expect that when they visit a doctor the information that is
revealed in the visit and recorded in their medical records will be kept

from the eyes of others. This may be a reasonable expectation in most
situations, but not necessarily if the medical records are sought for use in
court. No federal physician-patient privilege exists, and the existence and
scope of such a privilege varies across states.' The passage of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) has led to confu-

sion over the appropriate effect of state privileges in federal question
2
cases.
HIPAA required the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) to promulgate rules relating to privacy of protected health information.3 The resulting set of regulations, known as the HIPAA Privacy Rule,
contains a section discussing the use of protected health information, such
as medical records, in judicial proceedings. a Federal courts generally use
federal evidentiary rules where federal law supplies the rule of decision.5

1 See generally Kenneth S. Broun, The Medical Privilege in the Federal CourtsShould it Matter Whether Your Ego or Your Elbow Hurts?, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 657
(2004) (arguing for a federal physician-patient privilege to expand on psychotherapistpatient privilege).
2 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codified at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42
U.S.C. (2000)); see also Grace Ko, Note, PartialPreemption Under the Health Insurance
Portabilityand Accountability Act, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 497, 527-28 (2006) (arguing that
Congress should clarify its intent as to this issue).
3 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note (2000).
4 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2005).
5 FED. R. EVID. 501; see also In re Sealed Case (Medical Records), 381 F.3d 1205,
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Additionally, federal laws typically preempt contrary state laws.6 HIPAA,
however, contains a preemption clause stating that it will not "supercede
[sic] a contrary provision of State law, if the provision of State law imposes requirements, standards, or implementation specifications that are
more stringent than the requirements, standards, or implementation specifications imposed under the regulation."7
Courts have differed in their interpretation of HIPAA's preemption
clause in cases whose subject matter jurisdiction is based on a federal
question.8 Some courts have held that HIPAA should always control in
federal question cases. 9 Conversely, others have held that state privilege
laws should apply if they are more stringent.10 Still others have found middle ground, analyzing whether the particular state privilege law in question
is more stringent than HIPAA without generalizing as to HIPAA's effect
in all federal question cases. 1' This Note will argue that HIPAA should
control in federal question cases, regardless of whether state privilege laws
are more stringent. Future courts should acknowledge that Congress did
not intend for HIPAA to incorporate state privileges. Courts should not
compare the stringency of state privilege laws with HIPAA in federal
question cases because this confuses the proper analysis and could lead to
inappropriate control by state privilege laws in these cases.
Part II will provide an overview of relevant sections of HIPAA,
along with Congress and HHS's intent. This section will also review the
general doctrine of evidentiary privileges, various physician-patient and
medical records privileges in states, and the theory of preemption. Part III
will discuss various approaches taken by courts regarding the interpretation of HIPAA's preemption provision and the consequences that this has
on which privilege law will apply in federal question cases. Part IV will
analyze these approaches, and argue that HIPAA should preempt state
privilege laws in federal question cases, regardless of the stringency of
state law.

1212 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (recognizing preference for applying federal privilege law in cases
with both federal and state claims).
6 See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
7 HIPAA § 264(c)(2), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 2033-34. Courts and commenta-

tors have also referred to this as an anti-preemption clause, or as a supersession provision.
See, e.g., Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft (NAF New York), No. 1:03-CV-08695, 2004
WL 555701, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2004) (anti-preemption provision).
8 See infra Section III (for courts' differing interpretations). The United States Constitution gives federal courts power to hear cases arising under federal law. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2. Congress then extended "federal question" jurisdiction to federal district courts. 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
9 See infra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
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II. HIPAA, PRIVILEGES, PREEMPTION, AND CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT

A. Overview of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule
Congress enacted HIPAA on August 21, 1996.12 The purposes of
HIPAA were to ensure more consistent health insurance coverage, reduce
insurance fraud, and increase efficiency in insurance administration. 13
Many provisions, particularly those in the Administrative Simplification
section, would implicate privacy issues because they would result in increased sharing of individuals' health information. 14 Congress therefore
directed the Secretary of HHS to provide them with recommendations regarding appropriate standards to protect individuals' information privacy.15
If Congress failed to enact legislation encompassing the recommended
standards, then HHS was to issue regulations regarding privacy of protected health information.' 6 The task fell to HHS when Congress did not
enact such legislation.
In 2002, HHS promulgated the regulations known as the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, which detail the measures that must be taken to properly
handle protected health information. 7 Protected health information (PHI)
is individually identifiable health information, meaning someone could
potentially identify the individual by examining the health and demographic information contained in the PHI.' 8 All health plans, health care
clearinghouses, and health care providers who transmit health information
electronically are considered covered entities and must abide by the regulations.' 9
One section of the Privacy Rule pertains to the use of protected
health information in judicial and administrative proceedings, allowing
disclosure of such information after certain detailed procedures are fol2 HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at scattered sections of 18

U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
"3 HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, preface.
14 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d - 1320d-8 (2000) (Administrative Simplification Sections);
see also Ralph Ruebner & Leslie Ann Reis, Hippocrates to HIPAA: A Foundationfor a
Federal Physician-PatientPrivilege, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 505, 521-23 (2004) (reviewing

way's in which increased use of electronic medical records threatens patient privacy).
HIPAA, § 264(c)(1).
16 HIPAA, § 264(c)(1), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note (requiring Secretary to
issue regulations).
" 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2005). Covered health care providers were required to comply with the regulations by April 14, 2003. 45 C.F.R. § 164.534 (2005).
's 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005).
9 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2005).
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lowed. z If the presiding court issues a subpoena, the covered entity may
disclose medical records without providing notice to the patient. 21 If the
subpoena or discovery request is not court-ordered, the covered entity may
disclose the records after either providing notice to the affected individual
or obtaining a qualified protective order.22
B. Privileges
A privilege gives a witness the right to withhold certain information
from a judicial proceeding.23 Privileges are exceptions to the maxim that
"the public ... has a right to every man's evidence." 24 The policy underlying privileges is to encourage the free flow of information in certain relationships in which society highly values privacy. Many states provide for
such a privilege between patient and physician, usually via statute.26 These
statutes vary in scope but generally protect against requiring admission of
medical records into evidence.27
20 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2005).
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(i) (2005). This Note uses the phrase "medical records"

21

interchangeably with PHI because this is the more common term, but technically PHI can
also include information such as records of payment for health care. See 45 C.F.R. §
160.103 (2005).
22 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(vi) (2005). The covered entity may also disclose the information if the party seeking the records provides satisfactory assurance of reasonable
efforts to either provide notice or obtain a qualified protective order. 45 C.F.R. §
164.512(e)(1)(ii) (2005). The standards for adequate notice and for a qualified protective
order are found at 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.512(e)(1)(iii)-(v) (2005).
23 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (establishing federal psychotherapistpatient privilege); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (tracing history of
marital privilege allowing each spouse to prevent adverse testimony from the other).
24 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950))
(narrowing privilege against spousal testimony). The Court reasoned that privileges should
be construed narrowly to protect the policy of admitting probative evidence. Id.
25 See Ruebner & Reis, supra note 14, at 532-40 (reviewing the Jaffee court's reasoning , Ruebner & Reis, supra note 14, at 563-64.
27 See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 504 (LexisNexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

§ 600.2157 (West 2006); see also Ruebner & Reis, supra note 14, at 564-65 (surveying
similar state statutes). The Hawaii privilege provides:
A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other
person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose
of diagnosis or treatment of the patient's physical, mental, or emotional
condition, including alcohol or drug addiction, among oneself, the patient's physician, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or
treatment under the direction of the physician, including members of the
patient's family.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504 (LexisNexis 2006). The Michigan statute is drafted more
narrowly:
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Federal Rule of Evidence 501 governs privileges in federal
courts. 2' As a result of this rule, federal privileges control in federal courts

unless state law provides the rule of decision-in which case, state privileges apply. 29 The rule reflects the theory that where a particular state's
law provides the rule of decision in a case, that state has an interest in the
privilege policies that the court applies.30
If federal law applies, Rule 501 dictates the procedure to determine
which privileges, if any, pertain to the case. First, the court determines
whether an Act of Congress has created a privilege; if not, the court then
assesses whether federal courts have developed a common-law privilege
"in the light of reason and experience." 3' While federal courts currently
recognize a psychologist-patient privilege, no such federal privilege exists
to protect the physician-patient relationship or the resulting medical records.32
HIPAA fits into this framework in a rather complex way. Some
commentators argue that HIPAA was, in fact, an "Act of Congress" that
created a physician-patient privilege. 33 Others contend that while HIPAA
did not create a federal statutory privilege, federal courts should now rec-

Except as otherwise provided by law, a person duly authorized to practice
medicine or surgery shall not disclose any information that the person has
acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, if the information was necessary to enable the person to prescribe for the patient as a
physician, or to do any act for the patient as a surgeon.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2157 (West 2006)
28 FED. R. EvID. 501. The text of the Rule is
as follows:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EvID. 501.

See id.; see also In re Sealed Case (Medical Records), 381 F.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (leaving issue unresolved in cases containing both federal and state claims).
30 FED. R. EvID. 501 advisory committee's
note.
31 See FED. R. EViD. 501.
32 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (establishing psychotherapist-patient
privilege); Northwestern Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that federal common-law privileges do not extend to medical records).
33 See Ruebner & Reis, supra note 14, at 532-40 (arguing that HHS responded to Congress' broad grant of authority by creating a physician-patient privilege).
29

164

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XII

ognize a common-law privilege.3 4 Finally, some commentators propose
that the most efficient solution would be for Congress to revise HIPAA so
that it would completely preempt the area of medical information
privacy,
35

preventing states from creating physician-patient privileges.
C. Preemption and its Relation to HIPAA

The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution commands that the Constitution and federal laws enacted pursuant to
its authority "shall be the supreme Law of the Land., 36 The doctrine of
preemption originating in this clause establishes that federal law trumps
state law in particular areas if Congress so intends-expressly or impliedly-or if state law conflicts with federal law. 37 Express and conflict preemption are the types most pertinent to this discussion. Express preemption occurs when Congress enacts a statute explicitly stating that it will
preempt state law in the relevant field. 38 Conflict preemption exists in scenarios in which one cannot simultaneously comply with both state and
federal law because they are in conflict.39 In enacting HIPAA, Congress

expressly preempted some state laws relating to medical record-keeping.40
As mentioned earlier, however, Congress saved from preemption conflicting state laws if they provide more stringent protections for health infor34 See Broun, supra note 1, at 659 (proposing that physician-patient privilege should be

narrow in scope and modeled after existing psychotherapist-patient privilege); Ruebner &
Reis, supra note 14, at 540-74 (contending that even if HIPAA did not create new privilege, it provides foundation for common-law privilege through "reason and experience");
Molly Silfeti, Note and Comment, I Want My Information Back: Evidentiary Privilege
Following the PartialBirth Abortion Cases, 38 J.HEALTH L. 121, 132-34 (2005) (arguing
that courts should create federal physician-patient privilege that is "somewhat weaker" than
the psychiatrist-patient privilege). Professor Broun also provides a useful survey of legal
scholars' arguments for and against such a privilege. See Broun, supra note 1,at 683-91.
35 Jennifer Guthrie, Time is Running Out -- The Burdens and Challenges of HIPAA
Compliance: A Look at Preemption Analysis, The "Minimum Necessary" Standard,and
the Notice of Privacy Practices, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 143, 156-57 (2003) (proposing a
"federal ceiling" instead of a federal floor of regulations); see generally Rebecca H.
Bishop, Note, The FinalPatientPrivacy Regulations Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act -- Promoting Patient Privacy or Public Confusion?, 37 GA. L.
REv. 723 (2003).
36 U.S.CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
37 Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1988).
38 Id. at 299 ("Of course, Congress explicitly may define the extent to which its
enactments pre-empt state law.").
39 Id.at 300 ("Such a conflict will be found 'when it is impossible to comply with both
state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' (quoting Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite
Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581 (1987))). The third type, implied preemption, occurs when
Congress effectively occupies a field. Id
4u 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(1) (2000).

2007]

HIPAA IN FEDERAL QUESTION CASES

mation privacy.4
HHS included similar sections on preemption in the Privacy Rule
regulations, which state that the regulations as a whole preempt contrary
state law. 4 2 A notable exception to this general rule is the "antipreemption" clause, providing that HIPAA and its regulations will not
preempt a conflicting state provision that "relates to the privacy of individually identifiable health information and is more stringent than a standard, requirement, or implementation specification adopted under [the
privacy provisions] of this subchapter.A 3 It is this preemption provision
that has proven so troublesome in federal question cases. Some commentators and courts believe that the anti-preemption clause contained in HIPAA
gives state privileges that are more stringent the force of federal law in
federal question cases. 44
D. Intent of Congress and HHS
In drafting and enacting HIPAA, Congress did not explicitly address the issue of whether HIPAA would give more stringent state privilege laws the force of law in federal question cases. Congressional records
reveal, however, that several legislators expressed concern during debate
that HIPAA did not provide more substantial privacy protections. 45 Representative Jim McDermott from Washington was especially disturbed that
the bill required increased ease of transferring health information without
mandating "one single shred of protection of your privacy. ' '46 Other testi
mony indicates that the anti-preemption provision may have been included
in response to fears that HIPAA would override state health care and insurance reform efforts.47
In HHS' recommendations to Congress and in its final regulations,
the Secretary of HHS expressed an urgent need for privacy protections at
4

42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(2) (2000); HIPAA § 264(c)(2).

45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2005).
45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2005). This provision in the regulation complements the
similar statement in the statute. See supra note 7 (quoting relevant language from HIPAA).
44 See Ruebner & Reis, supra note 14, at 533-34 (construing HHS' commentary to
support this position); see also United States v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., No. Civ.
99-3298, 2004 WL 2009416, at *3-*4 (D.D.C. May 17, 2004) (holding Florida medical
privacy law to be more stringent than HIPAA).
45 See 142 CoNG. REC. S9501-01, S9516 (1996) (statement of Sen. Paul Simon); 142
CONG. REc. S9501-01, S9523 (1996) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
46 142 CONG. REc. H9785-02 (1996) (statement of Rep. Jim McDermott).
47 See 142 CONG. REC. H3029-03 (1996) (statement of Rep. Jim McDermott); see also
Amendment to Health Care Coverage Availability and Affordability Act: Hearing on H.R.
3103 Before the H. Rules Comm. (1996) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Furse); 142 CONG.
REc. H2972-01 (1996) (statement of Rep. Gene Green).
42

43
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the federal level. The Secretary explained that many factors, including the
rising use of electronic medical records and the attendant ease of information transfer, have increased the potential for misuse of private health
data.48 The Secretary believed that a federal floor of regulation in this area
would provide a minimum level of protection while reflecting HHS' policy
of guarding individuals' privacy surrounding their medical information.' 9
Although HHS recognized the importance of protecting medical
privacy, the agency did not intend for the Privacy Rule to affect existing
evidentiary privileges. 50 The Secretary explained that Congress and HHS
had balanced privacy considerations against competing policies in allowing disclosure for certain purposes, such as for judicial proceedings.5 1 In
construing the interaction of the Privacy Rule with more protective state
laws, the Secretary emphasized that such state laws would continue to apply where they "operate in the same area as the federal standards. 52
III. FEDERAL COURTS' VARYING APPROACHES
The question of whether state privilege laws, if more stringent than
HIPAA, should be used in federal question cases emerged in several courts
in 2004 when then-Attorney General John Ashcroft subpoenaed medical
records from various hospitals across the country. 53 This issue arose out of
a case filed in New York in which the National Abortion Federation and
seven physicians challenged the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (PBABA). 54 During discovery the Attorney General
48 See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
Re§, 82,462, 82,465 (Dec. 28, 2000) (preamble, not codified in C.F.R.).
See id. at 82,466 (explaining that state privacy rules are inconsistent and that health
information transfer is becoming increasingly national); see also id. at 82,471 (describing
Privacy Rule as federal floor above which states and regulated entities are free to provide
more privacy protections).
50 See id. at 82,596 (refusing to incorporate previously existing federal psychotherapistpatient privilege into regulations). The Secretary explicitly stated that creating any new
privileges would be beyond the scope of the authority that Congress delegated to HHS. Id.
51 See id.at 82,471 (recognizing that information privacy is not absolute and must be
balanced against other public expectations).
52 See id at 82,583 (emphasis added) ("state laws that are more protective of privacy
than contrary federal standards should remain").
53 See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft (NAF New York), No. 1:03-CV-08695, 2004
WL 555701, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2004) (enforcing subpoena of medical records held
by New York and Presbyterian Hospital); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcrofl,
No. C03-4872, 2004 WL 432222, at *1 (N.D. Cal. March 5, 2004) (denying motion to
compel production of medical records held by Planned Parenthood); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n
v. Ashcroft (NAF Illinois), No. 1:04-CV-00055, 2004 WL 292079, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6,
2004) (quashing subpoena of medical records held by Northwestern Hospital), aff'd sub
nom. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7h Cir. 2004).
14 18 U.S.C. § 1531, held unconstitutionalby Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437
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subpoenaed medical records of abortions performed by the plaintiff physiclans. 55 These included records at Northwestern Hospital in Illinois and at
New York and Presbyterian Hospital in New York-two hospitals that
challenged the subpoenas in their respective district courts.56 The resulting
decisions, along with other recent cases, illustrate the various ways that
courts have reconciled HIPAA with state privilege laws.
A. Stating that HIPAA Should Always Control in FederalQuestion Cases
Some courts have held that HIPAA, rather than any state privilege
law, should always control in cases in which courts have jurisdiction based
on a federal question. So far the only federal circuit Court of Appeals to
reach this conclusion has been the Seventh Circuit in Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. Ashcroft.7 Although the court ultimately affirmed the
quashing of the subpoena, it did so on different grounds from those of the
lower court. 58 The court of appeals explained that state privilege laws do
F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006), andPlanned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163
(9th Cir. 2006), and Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004), and Nat'l
Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd in part sub nom.
Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006). The Act, which the plaintiffs alleged was unconstitutional on several grounds, outlawed certain types of late-term
abortion procedures. Id. The district court later issued a permanent injunction against enforcement of the PBABA, holding it to be unconstitutional because it did not contain an
exception to allow the procedures when necessary to protect the health of the mother. Nat'l
Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 487, 492-93 (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914, 938 (2000)). A parallel case in California also challenged the PBABA, and the
plaintiffs in that case similarly opposed the resulting subpoenas for medical records.
PlannedParenthoodFed'n of Am., 2004 WL 432222, at *1. The California court did not
address HIPAA or any applicable state privilege. See id at * 1-*2. Instead, the court denied
the government's motions to compel the records on grounds of undue burden to the providers and privacy interests of the patients. Id
" NAF New York, 2004 WL 555701, at * 1. The government apparently sought these
records to test the physicians' assertions that the procedures in question were sometinmes
medically indicated. NAF Illinois, 2004 WL 292079, at * 1. The district court in New York
issued a protective order on January 23, 2004, which authorized the hospitals to redact the
records of some patient-identifying information, but not of any medical history. Id.
56 NAFNew York, 2004 WL 555701, at *1; NAFIllinois,2004 WL 292079, at *1. Both
hospitals claimed that the applicable state privilege law protected the records from disclosure. NAF Illinois, 2004 WL 292079, at *2; NAFNew York, 2004 WL 555701, at *2.
57 See Northwestern Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 926 ( th Cir. 2004); see
7
also supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (providing facts giving rise to this case).
The district court had previously quashed the government's subpoena for medical records
held by Northwestern Hospital. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (discussing
district court's reasoning).
58 Northwestern, 362 F.3d at 923. The court of appeals held that the medical records
should not be subject to subpoena because the government had been unable to articulate
any potential probative value of the records, and that this did not offset the ensuing invasion of patients' privacy. Id. at 927-33 (balancing relative hardships under FED. R. Civ. P.
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not apply in cases based on federal question jurisdiction.59 The court did
not explicitly discuss HIPAA's anti-preemption provision but reasoned
that it was not HHS's intent for the regulations to incorporate state law.60
Rather, HIPAA and the Privacy Rule are purely procedural in naturemerely establishing the requisite procedures for medical records to be

brought into court. 61
In the Southern District of New York, a judge faced the same facts
as those in Northwestern and came to a similar conclusion regarding
HIPAA and the use of state privileges. 62 This court was more explicit in its
analysis of HIPAA's anti-preemption provision than was the Seventh Circuit. 63 The district court distinguished a federal law that does not by its
64
terms preempt state law from a federal law that incorporates state law.
The former permits the state law to continue operating where it otherwise
would have if the federal law in question had not been in effect; in contrast, the latter actively adopts state law as federal law.65
The district court interpreted HIPAA's language as being more
similar to the former non-preemption situation. Thus, the anti-preemption
clause simply allows state privileges to have continued effect in state
court, and also in federal court when state law provides the rule of deci-

45(c)(3)(A)(iv)). The court considered, as one factor in its balancing, that Illinois' medical
records privilege would have dictated quashing the subpoena. Id. at 932-33. The court also
overruled the lower court's alternate holding that would have established a federal common-law privilege for the abortion records. Id. at 926.
59 Id. at 925-26; see also Kalinoski v. Evans, 377 F. Supp. 2d 136, 140-41 (D.D.C.
2005) (citing Northwestern and agreeing that federal privilege law applies when federal
claims are brought in federal court); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Boston
Mkt Corp., No. 2:03-CV-04227, 2004 WL 3327264, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2004) (refusing to decide whether state privilege law was more stringent in a case based on a federal
claim).
60 Northwestern, 362 F.3d at 925 ("[Wle think it improbable that HHS intended to open
such a can of worms when it set forth a procedure for disclosure of medical records in
litigation."). The court acknowledged at the outset of its analysis, however, that the question regarding the effect of HIPAA on state privileges in federal court is still "not free from
doubt." Id.
61 Id. at 925-26. Further, the court remarked that HIPAA is not an "Act of Congress"
that would create a privilege and remove the issue from the purview of federal commonlaw under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. Id. at 926.
62 Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft (NAF New York), No. 1:03-CV-08695, 2004 WL
555701, at *4-*6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2004) (refusing to apply New York privilege law).
The district court judge allowed the subpoena of the medical records to stand. Id at * 1. The
Attorney General, however, withdrew the subpoena after all of these cases were decided.
63 Compare NAF New York, 2004 WL 555701, at *4-*5, with Northwestern, 362 F.3d
at 925-26.
64 NAF New York, 2004 WL 555701, at *4 (reasoning that courts must look to Congressional intent to interpret which result statute dictates).
65 See id. at *4-*5 (comparing the former to the effect of a shield, and the latter to a
sword).
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sion.66 To support this proposition, the court provided contrasting exam-

ples of incorporation-type situations in which Congress makes explicit
statements such as "State standards to preempt applicable Federal standards"67 or "laws of each adjacent State ...are declared to be the law of
the United States., 68 The relevant language in HIPAA instead states only
that it will not preempt contrasting, more stringent state privilege laws.69
The court also quoted HHS, who authored the Privacy Rule regulations, as
interpreting HIPAA to not "give an effect to State law that it would not
otherwise have in the absence of section 264(c)(2).,, 70 This supports the
court's conclusion that HIPAA was not intended to incorporate state law
into federal law. 7'
B. Stating that More Stringent State PrivilegeLaws Should Apply
A minority of courts have held that even in federal question cases,
state privilege laws should apply if they are more stringent than the protections afforded by HIPAA. The first of these cases was National Abortion
Federation v. Ashcroft (NAF Illinois)-a case from the Northern District
of Illinois, which on appeal became Northwestern Memorial, discussed
above.7 2 NAF Illinois involved a subpoena for medical records for certain
patients of a physician-plaintiff in the original case in New York, challenging PBABA's constitutionality.7 3
66

See id. at *4-*5 ("The negative language in section 264(c)(2) does not equate to the

positive power to create binding law in the federal domain.").
67 Id. at *4 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 667(b)) (distinguishing HIPAA from law in which
Congress intended for state law to preempt federal law).
Id.at *4 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A)) (distinguishing HIPAA from law that
Congress intended to incorporate state standards).
6 Id. at *5.
70 Id. at *5 (quoting 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918, 60,000 (Nov. 3, 1999)). The court emphasized HHS' construction, saying that courts should look to the relevant administrative
agency's reasonable interpretation if a statute is silent on a particular issue. Id (citing
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
71 Id. at *6. The court also asserted that although HIPAA does not create a privilege, it
counts as an Act of Congress for the purposes of Fed. R. Evid. 501. Id.If other courts were
to adopt this view it would preclude development of a federal common-law privilege. Id.at
*6.
72 Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft (NAF Illinois), No. 1:04-CV-00055, 2004 WL
292079, at *5 (N.D. I11.
Feb. 6, 2004), aff'd sub nom. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp. v.
Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004). Although the court of appeals affirmed the ultimate
result regarding the subpoena in NAF Illinois, it disagreed with the district court's interpretation of HIPAA and how it relates to the Illinois medical-records privilege. See supra
notes 57-61 and accompanying text (discussing court of appeals' decision). The district
court's reasoning remains useful for study as the law in this subject area is unsettled, and it
is unclear what approach future courts will take.
73 Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (original
case challenging PBABA), aff'd in part sub nom. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437
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The district court in NAF Illinois quashed the subpoena on the basis
of Illinois' medical privacy law, which prevents physicians from disclosing patients' medical information without their consent.74 The court compared the scope of the Illinois statutory privilege with HIPAA's protections and found that the Illinois provisions were contrary to and more
stringent than HIPAA.75 In determining which provisions to apply, the
court interpreted HIPAA's anti-preemption clause to mean that HIPAA
"activated" Illinois's provisions, describing this as "a case of one federal
law displacing another., 76 The court reasoned that it must have been Congress' intent in enacting HIPAA to give federal effect to more stringent
state privilege laws because the Privacy Rule would otherwise be meaningless under Federal Rule of Evidence 501.77 Similarly, in United States
v. Diabetes Treatment Centers ofAmerica,78 the District Court for the District of Columbia found that Florida's state privilege law was in conflict
with and more stringent than the HIPAA provisions.79 The court reasoned
F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006); NAF Illinois, 2004 WL 292079, at * 1 (explaining that Northwestern had control over records because plaintiff-physician practiced there); see supra notes
53-56 and accompanying text (providing circumstances leading to these cases).
74 NAF Illinois, 2004 WL 292079, at *3, *5 (citing 735 ILCS 5/8-802). Illinois law
prevented disclosure in this situation even though the records would have been redacted of
certain patient-identifying information. Id.at *3.
75 Id. at *3-*4 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 for definition of "more stringent"). The
court determined that Illinois's provision does not allow a physician to disclose protected
information even in response to a subpoena, while "HIPAA regulations clearly allow a
hospital to disclose patient medical records, when ordered in judicial proceedings, subject
to... limitations." Id.at *3.This Note does not focus on the specifics of how to perform a
HIPAA preemption analysis because it is argued here that such analyses should not be
performed in federal question cases. Interested readers are referred to other commentators
for further elaboration on the mechanics of HIPAA preemption analyses. See Guthrie,
supra note 35, at 152-53 (arguing that covered heath care entities should not be forced to
perform such difficult legal analyses). See generally Beverly Cohen, Reconciling the
HIPAA PrivacyRule with State Laws Regulating Ex Parte Interviews of Plaintiffs' Treating
Physicians: a Guide to Performing HIPAA Preemption Analysis, 43 Hous. L. REv. 1091
(2006) (noting that courts have been inconsistent in analysis).
76 NAF Illinois, 2004 WL 292079, at *5 (rejecting government's argument that following Illinois law violates Supremacy Clause by allowing state law to trump federal law).
7 Id. at *5.The Illinois court reasoned that the lack of a federal common-law physician-patient privilege was not dispositive because HIPAA was an Act of Congress for the
purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 501. See id As an alternate means of quashing the
subpoena, the court also declared there to be a federal physician-patient privilege protecting
abortion records. See id. at *6 (holding that reason and experience dictate a privilege under
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 for such sensitive information as abortion records).
78 No. Civ. 99-3298, 2004 WL 2009416 (D.D.C. May 17, 2004).
79 Id. at * 1. The case involved medical records from twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia; however, only those from Florida were at issue here because only Florida's privilege law was in conflict with and more stringent than HIPAA's protections. Id. at
*2 (reviewing state-by-state analysis taken by Diabetes Treatment Centers of America).
The Florida law required that notice be provided to non-party patients whose medical records would be brought into the action, while HIPAA would not require notice if the dis-
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that HIPAA did not preempt the state law because of HIPAA's antipreemption language.8 °
C. Performing Comparison of HIPAA with State PrivilegeLaws
Some courts exercising federal question jurisdiction have performed comparisons to determine whether HIPAA or the relevant state
privilege law offers greater privacy protections. For example, in Creely v.
Genesis Health Ventures,81 the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania exercised federal question jurisdiction and addressed
whether the defendant would be required to produce certain medical records during discovery. 82 The court determined that HIPAA did not prevent the court-ordered production of the records.83 Significantly, the court
also evaluated whether Pennsylvania's medical records confidentiality
statute allowed the records to be withheld.84 While the Creely court did not
formally analyze whether the state statute should apply in a federal question case, it referenced HIPAA's anti-preemption language and implied
that if Pennsylvania's law had prevented disclosure it would have controlled in the case.85
The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana performed a
similar analysis in United States ex rel. Stewart v. Louisiana Clinic,86 in
which the court addressed whether HIPAA or Louisiana privilege law prevented nonparty medical records from disclosure. 87 The Stewart court exclosure were pursuant to a court order. Id. at *3-*4 (using notice requirement to fulfill both
elements: being contrary to and more stringent than HIPAA).
80 See id. (applying HIPAA retroactively to case that arose before the regulations went
into effect). The court noted that the compliance requirements associated with HIPAA are
confusing for entities that must comply with them, especially because there is so little
precedent in this area. Id. at *5 (citing Jennifer Guthrie, Time is Running Out -- The Burdens and Challenges of HIPAA Compliance: A Look at Preemption Analysis, The "Minimum Necessary" Standard,and the Notice of Privacy Practices, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L.
143, 146-47 (2003)).
81 No. 2:04-CV-00679, 2004 WL 2943661, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2004).
82 Creely, 2004 WL 2943661, at *1 (denying defendant's motion to prevent disclosure). The particular medical records at issue concerned a deceased non-party individual.
Id. at *2.
83 Id. at *3 (noting that a non-party's records can be disclosed even without notice to
the patient pursuant to a court order).
4 Id. at *3-*4 (citing 28 Pa. Code § 211.5(b) (2004)).
85 See id. (evaluating whether Pennsylvania law was more stringent than HIPAA by
applying Pennsylvania's standard, which allows disclosure for good cause). The court held
that under the facts of this case the Pennsylvania statute did not prevent disclosure, creating
a similar result under either HIPAA or Pennsylvania law. Id. (finding disclosure of redacted
records posed little potential for harm to the deceased patient).
86 No. 99-1767, 2002 WL 31819130, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 2002).
87 Stewart, 2002 WL 31819130, at *1 (case brought under the False Claims Act, 31
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plicitly noted that federal-not state-confidentiality law typically controls in federal question cases. 88 The court reasoned, however, that if the
Louisiana law met the requirements of the HIPAA anti-preemption language, the state law would apply to the case.8 9 Ultimately, the Stewart
court held that HIPAA preempted the Louisiana law because it did not
satisfy the required elements to be exempt from preemption.9"
IV. ANALYSIS

A. HIPAA Was Not an Act of Congress Creating a Privilege
Congress did not intend to create a federal physician-patient privilege in enacting HIPAA. Congress has used much more direct language

when creating other privileges by statute. For example, one such statute
creating a privilege for certain highway safety reports dictates that such
reports "shall not be subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in a
Federal or State court proceeding." 9' Another statute creating a privilege

for patient safety work product clearly states that "patient safety work
product shall be privileged and shall not be subject to ...subpoena or order..., subject to discovery.., admitted as evidence in any Federal, State,
or local governmental civil proceeding, criminal proceeding, administrative rulemaking proceeding, or administrative adjudicatory proceeding...
or admitted in a professional disciplinary proceeding., 92 Congress did not
U.S.C. § 3729). Relators in the case sought the complete medical records in question, while
the defendants requested that they only be required to produce records after redaction of
patient-identifying information. Id.
88

Id. at *2.

89

See id. at *4-*5 (electing to perform HIPAA analysis despite HIPAA not yet being in

effect); see also Bayne v. Provost, 359 F. Supp. 2d 234 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (case brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The Bayne court similarly stated that state privileges do not apply
in federal question cases, but then proceeded to analyze whether the New York law was
more stringent than the protections provided by HIPAA. Id. at 238-41. Although the court
ultimately held that New York law did not offer more protections and was thus preempted
by HIPAA, this implied that the court would have applied New York confidentiality law to
the federal question case if it had found the reverse. See id at 239-41.
90 Stewart, 2002 WL 31819130, at *5 (holding that the Louisiana statute was not more
stringent than HIPAA in that it did not address "the form, substance, or the need for express
legal permission from an individual" (citing 45 C.F.R. § 160.202)).
9 23 U.S.C. § 409. Courts have held that the policy underlying this provision is to
"[f]oster the free flow of safety-related information by precluding the possibility that such
information later would be admissible in civil suits." Perkins v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 584
N.E.2d 794, 802 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
92 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22. Patient safety work product includes reports "developed by a
provider for reporting to a patient safety organization ... or developed by a patient safety
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intend for HIPAA to directly create a physician-patient privilege because it
did not use similar explicit language as in these other statutes.
Congress also did not intend for HIPAA to incorporate state privileges and thereby implement a de facto federal privilege.93 Had this been
the case, it surely would have been an issue of debate, not only among
those in Congress but also among academic and legal commentators, during the drafting and passage of HIPAA.94 Rather, Congress intended to
increase efficiency and reduce fraud in the administration of health insurance. 95 The privacy provisions, relegated to formation by regulation, were
primarily added to ensure that the increasing transfer of electronic health
information would not lead to information misuse, to give patients the
right to consent to various uses of their personal data, and to provide individuals access to their own medical records. 96 The Secretary of HHS remarked in the preamble to the Privacy Standards that the regulations were
not intended to create a new privilege, as this would be beyond the scope
of authority that Congress had delegated to the agency.9 7
If Congress did not intend to create a privilege, then HIPAA was
not an Act of Congress for the purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 501.
On the contrary, HIPAA is purely procedural in nature and allows the use
of protected medical information in court when litigants comply with the
procedures in the Privacy Rule.98 Courts apply HIPAA in determining
what procedures are required, but this does not equate to a privilege. Instead, a true privilege results from society valuing the privacy of a particular relationship to such a degree that it is willing to forgo in-court use of
any relevant information arising from that relationship. 99 The Privacy Rule
organization for the conduct of patient safety activities." 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(A); see
also 42 U.S.C. 3614-1(a)(2) (using phrase "shall be privileged" to create privilege for reports of certain self-tests).
93 See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (describing purpose of HIPAA and
Privacy Rule).
94 Instead, during the debates on HIPAA, legislators commented on the lack of accompanying privacy protections. See supra note 45-46 and accompanying text (providing examples of legislators' fears about HIPAA's lack of attendant privacy protections).
96 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (summarizing HIPAA's purposes).
96 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
9 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (providing Secretary's caution that HIPAA
regulations did not create any new privilege).
9
See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (summarizing HIPAA's requirements
for use of medical records in judicial proceedings); supra note 61 and accompanying text
(discussing Northwestern's reasoning that HIPAA was purely procedural). The court in
NAF Illinois explained that "HIPAA's regulations clearly allow a hospital to disclose patient medical records, when ordered in judicial proceedings, subject to . . .limitations."
Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft (NAF Illinois), No. 1:04-CV-00055, 2004 WL 292079, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2004), aff'd sub nom. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362
F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004).
99 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (discussing policy reasons behind
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does not reach the same policy conclusion; although Congress and HHS
recognized the importance of privacy of medical information, they chose
to allow the use of this information in courts. 100
Rule 501 dictates that courts then look to federal common-law
privileges in situations such as this where Congress has not so acted. 10'
Congress did not intend for HIPAA to preempt state law in the area of
medical information privacy, and the Privacy Rule would presumably not
10 2
conflict with any privilege that courts may establish in the future.
HIPAA merely provides the minimum procedures necessary to bring private medical information into court; a privilege that would disallow the
use entirely would go beyond the present floor of protection. 103 This leaves
courts the freedom to develop
a federal common-law physician-patient
10 4
privilege if they so choose.
B. HIPAA Does Not Direct Courts to Apply More Stringent State Privilege
Laws in FederalQuestion Cases
The plain language of HIPAA does not direct federal law to incorporate state privilege laws. 10 5 HIPAA's anti-preemption section states that
its provisions do not supersede contrary state laws that "[impose] requirements, standards, or implementation specifications that are more stringent
than [those] imposed under the regulation." 10 6 State privilege laws do not
impose any requirements in cases where courts exercise federal question
jurisdiction, as federal privilege law controls in these cases. 10 7 Thus, the
anti-preemption language could have no effect on state law in these cases
providing a privilege); see also supra note 27 (providing examples of state physicianpatient privileges).
100 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (explaining HHS's policy valuing
privacy while balancing against other competing policies).
101 See supra note 31 and accompanying text (setting out analysis under FED. R. EVID.

501).

102

See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text (providing overview of preemption

doctrine and HIPAA's preemption language). Federal law preempts state law in a particular
area if Congress so intends or if federal and state laws are in conflict with one another. Id.
103 See supra note 49 and accompanying text (characterizing Privacy Rule as a federal
floor of regulations).

104See supra note 49 and accompanying text. The Secretary of HHS explained that
states and regulated agencies are free to provide more protections than does HIPAA. Id.By
inference, the federal courts or Congress are also free to provide increased protections in
the future. See id
105 See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text (summarizing reasoning of Nat'l
Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft in distinguishing simple non-preemption language from that of
incorporation).
10n 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note (1996).
107 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (explaining that federal courts only
apply state privilege laws where state law provides rule of decision).
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because state law never would have applied in the absence of HIPAA.' °8
The anti-preemption provision applies only in state courts and in federal
court cases in which state law provides the rules of decision-i.e., diversity jurisdiction.10 9
Congress did not intend for state laws to preempt HIPAA or for
HIPAA to incorporate state laws." 0 Congress has been more explicit in
giving state law the force and effect of federal law in those instances
where it has chosen to do so."' No similar explicit language was used in
HIPAA's anti-preemption provision, implying that Congress did not intend
such a result.' 12
Further, HHS did not believe that the Privacy Rule gave federal effect to state privilege laws. 113 HHS attempted to balance individuals' privacy interests with various competing public interests, such as the use of
relevant medical record information in judicial proceedings. 1 4 The Privacy
Rule allows for disclosure in such situations, even without the individual
patient's consent, so long as proper procedures are followed. 15 HHS emphasized that the rule dictates the procedures parties must use in obtaining
health information; it does not disturb any previously existing state or federal privileges." 6 State privileges never existed in federal question cases,
so the Privacy Rule's only effect in these cases is to provide procedures for

disclosure."17
The Seventh Circuit properly held that the Privacy Rule does not
allow for state privileges to apply in federal question cases. 18 While that
court recognized that this point was "not free from doubt," the majority of

108

See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (providing HHS's understanding that

HIPAA had no effect on existing privileges).
109 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (surveying courts that have so held).
110See supra note 66 and accompanying text (providing conclusion of Nat ' Abortion
Fed'n v. Ashcrofi).
11' See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (quoting other statutes in which Congress more explicitly intended for federal law to incorporate state law). For example, Congress has used phrases such as "State standards to preempt applicable Federal standards" or
"laws of each adjacent State ... are declared to be the law of the United States." Id.
112See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (distinguishing HIPAA's language
from that in incorporation-type statutes).
113See supra note 70 and accompanying text (quoting HHS's statement made during
notice and comment period).
114See supra note 51 and accompanying text (stating balancing is necessary because
privacy interest is not absolute).
115See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing procedures for use of
medical records in judicial proceedings).
116 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (summarizing Secretary's statements).
117 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing Northwestern's reasoningl8 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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courts analyzing this issue have also reached the same conclusion.' 1 9 The
problematic cases are those in which courts exercising federal question
jurisdiction perform preemption analyses, in which they determine if the
relevant state privilege law is more stringent than the protections offered
by HIPAA.12 0 These cases create the potential for state laws to improperly
control in federal courts, and also confuse the proper analysis. 21 Future
courts should follow the Seventh
Circuit's lead and decline to perform
122
these preemption analyses.
V. CONCLUSION
While many states recognize statutory physician-patient privileges,
there is no similar privilege in the federal courts. HIPAA did not have the
effect of creating such a privilege-either directly or by federalizing state
privileges. HIPAA's preemption language allows more stringent state
privileges to continue their previous effect in state courts, but does not
permit courts exercising federal question jurisdiction to apply these state
privileges. Federal courts currently performing preemption analyses to
determine if the applicable state statute is more stringent than HIPAA are
improperly giving federal effect to state law.
Privacy surrounding medical records is certainly an important
value; however, it must be balanced against other values, such as free
availability of relevant evidence in judicial proceedings. Congress and
federal courts have thus far chosen to weigh the balance on the side of
admissibility of medical records and have not enacted a federal physicianpatient privilege. While HIPAA did not itself create such a privilege, its
passage is a public recognition of the need for privacy protections in an
environment in which it is increasingly easy to transfer information. Until
either Congress or the federal judiciary build upon this recognition and
formally recognize a physician-patient privilege, states' privileges should
not control in federal courts.

JennaPhipps

119 See supra note 60 and accompanying text (quoting Northwestern). But see supra
note 72 and accompanying text (summarizing cases holding that more stringent state privilege law applied in federal question cases).
120 See supra notes 75, 79, 84-90 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 75, 79, 84-90 and accompanying text (summarizing cases in which
courts either used or implied that they would use state privileges).
122 See supra notes 57 and 59 and accompanying text (stating Seventh Circuit was first
court of appeals to hold that HIPAA does not direct federal courts to apply state privileges).

